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Using TRIPS flexibilities to facilitate access to medicines
Dianne Nicola & Olasupo Owoeyea
TRIPS and access to medicines
When the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) was annexed to the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, it 
set minimum standards for intellectual property (IP) protec-
tion that must be observed and enforced by all WTO Member 
States.1,2 TRIPS negotiations were long and complex, as docu-
mented by many commentators.3–5 Many low- and middle 
income countries (as classified by the World Bank) resisted 
the inclusion of an IP regime in the WTO system because they 
feared that it might obstruct development goals and access 
to important goods such as essential medicines.6 Ultimately, 
however, they were constrained to accept the “TRIPS package” 
as an indivisible component of the WTO system. Since TRIPS 
came into force, bilateral and regional trade agreements have 
tended to set even higher standards for IP protection, in what 
Peter Drahos refers to as “the global ratchet” for IP rights.7
An extensive body of commentary has been generated 
on the potentially detrimental effects of various aspects of the 
TRIPS package on public health and development, particularly 
in low- and lower-middle-income countries.8–10 Inadequate 
provision of basic public health care continues to afflict many 
of these countries. The United Nations (UN) clearly recognizes 
this. In 2001, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights stated that national and international IP regimes must 
be consistent with the human rights obligations of states.11 In 
2011, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the 
need to preserve TRIPS flexibilities to facilitate measures for 
improving access to health care, and United Nations Member 
States agreed that IP rights provisions in trade agreements 
should not undermine these flexibilities.12
The World Health Organization (WHO) has taken several 
measures to counteract the potentially adverse health impact 
of IP protection. In particular, in 2008 the sixty-first World 
Health Assembly adopted Resolution 61.21, which endorsed 
the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, In-
novation and Intellectual Property.13 This Global Strategy aims, 
among other things, to improve the delivery of and access to 
health products and medical devices by effectively overcoming 
barriers to access. Adoption of the Global Strategy followed an 
18-month period of deliberations and meetings of the WHO 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health.14 More 
recent measures by the WHO include an intensive study on 
access to medical technologies and innovation, conducted in 
collaboration with the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO),15 as 
well as release of its Zero Draft Global Plan for the Prevention 
and Control of Non-communicable Diseases 2013–2020.16 Vari-
ous forms of technical assistance have been provided by WIPO 
to low- and lower-middle-income countries in formulating IP 
laws and policies using the TRIPS flexibilities.17
These ongoing activities on the part of international agen-
cies are vital in addressing the growing public health crisis in 
the world’s poorest countries. Relevant domestic activity in 
the majority of industrialized nations has, however, failed to 
match this international activity. With this in mind, the spe-
cific question that this paper examines is whether it is possible 
for rich countries to create robust and workable legislative 
frameworks to facilitate the delivery of essential medicines 
to their poorer neighbours within TRIPS flexibilities. It is 
argued that this is necessary because the responsibility of 
providing health care to those most in need should not be left 
solely to middle-income countries that have thriving generic 
pharmaceutical industries, such as Brazil (which is classified 
as upper-middle-income) and India (lower-middle-income). 
It is contrary to the tenets and spirit of articles 66 and 67 of 
TRIPS to leave this task entirely to middle-income countries; 
those articles enjoin rich countries to facilitate technology 
transfer to low- and lower-middle-income countries and 
provide technical support where needed.
TRIPS compulsory licensing flexibility
The key TRIPS flexibility, as highlighted in the Doha Declara-
tion on TRIPS and Public Health (the Doha Declaration),18 is 
the right of WTO Member States to include in their patent leg-
islation a provision for use without authorization of the patent 
holder, as provided in Article 31. “Compulsory licensing” is the 
term generally adopted in domestic legislation implementing 
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Article 31. Although the grounds upon 
which compulsory licences can be grant-
ed are not limited by TRIPS, Article 31 
provides a list of minimum standards 
that must be included in implementing 
legislation. However, these require-
ments are relaxed to some extent for 
public non-commercial use, in national 
emergencies, and other circumstances 
of extreme urgency, and in the face of 
anticompetitive conduct. Article 5 of the 
Doha Declaration confirms that WTO 
Member States have the freedom to 
determine the grounds for compulsory 
licensing and that public health crises, 
including those linked to the epidemics 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
infection, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other diseases, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstance of 
extreme urgency.
Following the Doha Declaration, 
several compulsory licences were issued 
for generic manufacture of patented 
pharmaceuticals.19,20 Some countries, 
most notably Thailand, developed an 
express strategy of using compulsory 
licensing to reduce health-care costs.21 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
debate the legitimacy of such strategies 
or of the retaliatory response from other 
countries, which have been discussed in 
detail elsewhere.19,22 Rather, the focus of 
this paper is on how compulsory licens-
ing might be used by rich countries to 
assist those countries that lack any drug 
manufacturing capacity. Article 31(f) of 
TRIPS has constrained countries that do 
have manufacturing capacity in their 
ability to provide assistance because it 
requires that manufacture under com-
pulsory licensing be predominantly for 
supply of the domestic market, even 
when the licence is issued for a national 
emergency or other circumstance of 
extreme urgency or for public, non-
commercial use. This problem was well 
recognized in Doha negotiations and 
resulted in the inclusion of Paragraph 6 
in the Doha Declaration, which called 
on the TRIPS Council to find an “ex-
peditious solution.” After a period of 
protracted negotiations, the Doha Para-
graph 6 Implementation Decision (the 
Implementation Decision) was adopted 
in August 2003.23 One key aspect of the 
Implementation Decision was an agree-
ment to waive reliance on Article 31(f). 
Some time later, the Protocol Amending 
the TRIPS Agreement (the Protocol) was 
adopted by the WTO General Council 
on 6 December 2005.24
In essence, the Implementation De-
cision and the Protocol allow countries 
with manufacturing capacity to adopt 
legislation that permits the granting of 
compulsory licences for the production 
of pharmaceuticals for export, and coun-
tries that lack manufacturing capacity to 
introduce equivalent legislation to facili-
tate import. That said, both instruments 
impose stringent conditions on the 
terms of the implementing legislation, a 
fact that has sparked criticism that such 
legislation is unworkable in practice.25 
The crucial question is whether the 
framework that has been established by 
the Implementation Decision and the 
Protocol is so flawed that it should be 
abandoned.26
To date, there is little to suggest 
that the Implementation Decision and 
the Protocol can meaningfully con-
tribute to reversing the failure of the 
industrialized world to supply essential 
medicines to the countries that need 
them the most. Nor does there appear 
to be widespread enthusiasm for using 
Implementation Decision and Protocol 
mechanisms to facilitate the provision 
of low-cost or no-cost pharmaceuticals 
to those most in need. Although the 
waiver remains in place, the Protocol 
is not yet in force and will only take 
effect upon acceptance by two thirds of 
all WTO Member States. So far, only 45 
of the 155 Member States of the WTO 
have accepted the amendment.27 The 
deadline for accession was originally 1 
December 2007 but has been extended 
three times and now expires on 31 De-
cember 2013. Still fewer countries and 
territories have implemented the Pro-
tocol. To date, only Albania, Canada, 
China, Croatia, European Communi-
ties, Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, India, the Republic of Korea, 
Norway, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Switzerland have notified that they 
have implemented compliant domes-
tic legislation.28 Moreover, nine years 
after the adoption of the Implementa-
tion Decision, only Rwanda has used 
the system to import antiretrovirals 
(ARVs) from Canada,29 and the period 
it took to achieve that was anything but 
expeditious.30 Granted, the Implemen-
tation Decision was never intended to 
deliver medicines at affordable prices, 
but rather, to ensure that countries 
lacking manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector could benefit 
from the TRIPS compulsory licensing 
regime. Can it be said to have deliv-
ered on that mandate? Even the TRIPS 
Council has not been able to give its 
unequivocal support.31
The need to have in place a robust 
global system to allow for the legitimate 
manufacture of generic ARVs for HIV 
infection is as pressing as ever. Malaria, 
tuberculosis and other diseases also 
continue to spread on epidemic scales 
and new health crises continue to 
emerge.32 Low-income countries have 
until 2016 to comply fully with TRIPS,10 
but middle-income countries, including 
some of the key producer countries such 
as Brazil, India and Thailand, had to ac-
cept earlier dates for compliance. Indian 
generic pharmaceutical companies have 
been lead suppliers of ARVs and other 
medicines in the non-industrialized 
world,33 but their capacity to continue 
to supply such drugs is limited now that 
the country has become fully compliant 
with TRIPS. India did not provide patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products 
before 2005. Thus, generic manufac-
turing and export of drugs that were 
under patent in other countries could 
take place without the risk of patent 
infringement action.34 The manufacture 
and export of cheap generic versions of 
patented drugs can now only continue 
under licence from the patent holder or 
through compulsory licensing, which 
puts India in the same situation as other 
countries that have allowed pharmaceu-
tical patents for many years.
Strategies for delivering 
cheaper medicines
New strategies are being considered to 
ensure that cheaper medicines flow to 
countries most in need. They include 
public–private partnerships,35 prize 
schemes,36,37 patent pools,38 tax incen-
tives39 and other measures. Although 
these schemes hold promise, they tend 
to focus on the production of new 
medicines, which is inevitably a long and 
risky process.40 What should be more 
immediately achievable is the delivery of 
medicines already in existence but un-
available through conventional channels 
where pharmaceutical patents allow for 
monopoly pricing. The flexibilities in-
herent in the TRIPS Agreement, as con-
firmed in the Doha Declaration, provide 
the framework for this to be achieved. 
By agreeing to the Doha Declaration, 
governments in some of the wealthi-
est countries clearly recognized their 
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obligations in this regard. For example, 
in 2003 in Australia, the then Minister 
for Trade, Hon Mark Vaile, stated in 
reference to the negotiations around 
the implementation of paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration that:
“… all WTO member countries had a 
moral obligation to resolve this issue … 
we must move past old battle lines and 
all work to ensure the solution makes its 
contribution to dealing with the public 
health problems poorer countries face.”41
Agreement on the utilization of 
compulsory licensing through the 
Implementation Decision and the Pro-
tocol in places lacking manufacturing 
capacity would appear to be an impor-
tant further step in the right direction. 
However, it seems that during the course 
of negotiations over the implementa-
tion of paragraph 6 the desire of rich 
countries to constructively participate 
in finding an appropriate resolution 
dwindled.42 Inevitably, as so often hap-
pens with international agreements of 
this nature, TRIPS, the Doha Declara-
tion and their sequelae were political 
compromises that did not necessarily 
correspond with the intentions stated 
at the outset. Despite this, it is argued 
here that these mechanisms should not 
yet be abandoned completely, if nothing 
else because of the lack of other available 
options to fill the void. All countries with 
manufacturing capacity should instead 
be striving to implement legislation in 
compliance with the Protocol as a matter 
of urgency.
As a first step towards making the 
compulsory licensing model more work-
able, countries should be looking to 
implementation strategies that impose 
minimal obligations on potential licens-
ees and importing countries. In this re-
gard, the Canadian experience perhaps 
provides a useful example of how not 
to approach the implementation task.30 
Hurdles in the Canadian legislation that 
go beyond the obligations prescribed in 
the Implementation Decision and the 
Protocol include: (i) a requirement to 
list eligible pharmaceutical products, 
together with complex procedures 
for additions to the list; (ii) stringent 
negotiation requirements, including 
during national emergencies or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency; (iii) 
complex notification procedures with 
some double reporting requirements 
for export and import countries; and 
(iv) lack of provision for amendment 
of compulsory licences, once issued.43,44 
Attempts to amend the Canadian 
legislation to remove some of these 
hurdles have so far been unsuccessful 
but continue.45
How, then, might countries take 
a better approach to the implementa-
tion process? The situation today is 
increasing in complexity because of the 
many bilateral free trade agreements 
that have been entered into, often with 
TRIPS-plus obligations.10,46 From an 
Australian perspective, for example, 
while TRIPS provides no limitations 
on the grounds for compulsory licens-
ing, Article 17.9.7(b) of the Australia–
United States Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA) limits the grounds to cases 
of public non-commercial use, national 
emergency, other circumstances of 
extreme urgency and anticompetitive 
conduct. Although this list probably 
covers most of the circumstances in 
which Australian companies might 
be requested to provide medicines to 
those in need in other countries, the 
rationale for restricting compulsory 
licensing to these grounds is unclear.47 
Although Australian legislation limited 
the grounds for compulsory licences 
before entering into the AUSFTA, the 
difficulty that this agreement presents 
is that it circumscribes the capacity for 
the Australian Parliament to amend the 
legislation in the future.
The Australian draft 
legislation
The Australian government has recently 
drafted a bill amending national patent 
legislation, to provide a legal environ-
ment for exporting pharmaceuticals 
under Protocol and AUSFTA conditions. 
The Exposure Draft Intellectual Property 
Laws Amendment Bill 2012 was released 
for public comment in August 2012.48 
This draft legislation provides a useful 
case study of the way in which rich na-
tions can draft legislation in compliance 
with the Implementation Decision and 
the Protocol within the additional con-
fines imposed by a bilateral free trade 
agreement. The Explanatory Memoran-
dum to the Exposure Draft lists an eight-
step process created by the legislation for 
obtaining a licence (referred to in the 
legislation as a “patented pharmaceutical 
invention compulsory licence” or PPI 
compulsory licence).49 Table 1 provides 
an overview and commentary of the 
eight-step process.
For the most part, the Amendment 
Bill appears to have been written in a 
way that imposes minimal obligations on 
licensees and importing countries, while 
taking into account the requirements im-
posed by the Implementation Decision, 
the Protocol and the AUSFTA. The re-
strictions imposed internationally make 
it difficult to see how the overarching 
design of the framework could be altered 
substantially. Admittedly, important 
obligations remain, each of which may 
be a disincentive for uptake by generic 
manufacturers and importing countries.
Médecins Sans Frontières has high-
lighted several shortcomings of the 
international regime, among them (i) 
the requirement for negotiations with 
the patent holder (which can be waived 
for situations of national emergency, 
extreme urgency and public non-com-
mercial use); (ii) separate labelling 
and marketing requirements; (iii) the 
requirement of notifying the WTO, 
which opens importing countries to 
pressure; and (iv) the lack of flexibility 
and of the ability to respond to changed 
circumstances in a timely fashion (e.g. 
the requirement that a new application 
be submitted to provide unused drugs 
to other countries).50
The additional requirement in the 
draft Australian legislation of engaging 
in prior negotiation in circumstances of 
public non-commercial use may create 
a further disincentive, together with 
the requirement to apply for a licence 
through a judicial rather than admin-
istrative process. On the other hand, it 
is well recognized that countries must 
maintain a fine balance in their patent 
legislation to ensure that the patent 
grant has some value. If there are too 
many ways to work around patent 
rights, the incentive to innovate may be 
reduced. The risk of re-importation to 
the manufacturing country or to other 
markets is perhaps the most serious 
concern for patent holders and explains 
why the notification, labelling and 
marketing requirements were included 
in the Implementation Decision and 
the Protocol. It is hard to imagine that 
these obligations could ever be negoti-
ated out of the international framework 
and, as such, generic manufacturers and 
importing countries have to find ways to 
accommodate them.
Although this Amendment Bill is 
not the perfect solution, it appears to 
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have sufficient merit to be introduced 
and passed by the Australian Parliament. 
However, implementing this legislation 
is not enough; it must also be used, as 
otherwise it risks becoming yet another 
redundant process in Australian pat-
ent law, in light of the fact that generic 
compulsory licensing provisions have 
existed for many years but not a single 
licence has been issued.47
Conclusion
Australia’s move towards putting into 
practice the Implementing Decision 
and the Protocol is a positive step in 
redressing the imbalance in the ability to 
access medicines between lower-income 
countries and rich countries. Other rich 
countries that have not yet implemented 
compliant legislation should follow suit 
with due haste. Implementation will not 
solve the problem of lack of access to 
essential medicines in poor countries, 
but it is an important step.
If legislation of the nature of Aus-
tralia’s Amendment Bill is ever to be 
more than a symbolic gesture, govern-
ments will need to encourage generic 
manufacturers to manufacture under 
compulsory licence for export to ben-
eficiary countries by providing tax or 
other incentives. Beyond this, Australia 
and other rich countries are in an ideal 
position to help their close neighbours 
improve their own generic manufactur-
ing capabilities through financial aid, 
technology transfer, infrastructure and 
training. ■
Competing interests: None declared.
Table 1. Essential steps in applying for a patent pharmaceutical invention compulsory licence under the Australian Exposure Draft 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2012
Essential steps Details Commentary
Identify the relevant 
patent(s)
– includes patented pharmaceutical products and 
processes
– makes good sense for PPI compulsory licences to be 
available for processes as well as products
Try to obtain 
authorization
– not necessary for national emergency or other 
circumstance of extreme urgency but needed for 
public non-commercial use (which is not defined)
– requirement goes beyond TRIPS for public non-commercial 
use
– less onerous than Canadian legislation, which requires an 
attempt to obtain authorization in all circumstances
Notify intent to use the 
system
– if no authorization granted after 30 days, or in 
a national emergency or other circumstance of 
extreme urgency, eligible importing countrya 
notifies TRIPS Council (if WTO member) or 
Commissioner of Patents (if not)
– notification of this nature is a mandatory Protocol 
requirement
– 30 days is a reasonable timeframe, mirroring that of other 
countries
– appropriate to have expedited processes for national 
emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency
Apply to Federal Court 
for compulsory licence
– must include a statement from the eligible 
importing country that it will take reasonable 
measures to prevent re-exportation (which are not 
defined)
– Parties: applicant, patentee, others with an interest 
through patentee, importing country (their option)
– Key considerations: good faith; import for national 
emergency, other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, or public non-commercial use; compliance 
with notification requirements (prescribed by 
regulation)
– fear of re-exportation is sticking point for manufacturing 
countries. As such, adequate mechanisms for prevention 
are essential
– query whether preferable to have an administrative 
procedure (e.g. to Commissioner for Patents), as in Canada 
(TRIPS is silent on this)
– AUSFTA limits grounds. Query whether other grounds are 
needed: may depend on the breadth of the public non-
commercial use ground
Notify granting of 
licence
– notify Commissioner of Patents of licence and web 
site where shipment information will be provided. 
Commissioner notifies the TRIPS Council
– not unduly onerous, but there are concerns about 
importing countries being exposed to pressure by having 
to disclose
Manufacture and 
export
– in accordance with terms of the (non-exclusive) 
licence, including quantities, purpose, labelling, 
duration
– these conditions could deter entry of generic products
Notify details of 
shipment
– quantities, destinations, labelling and markings of 
the product(s) posted on the nominated web site
– could deter entry of generics
Determine 
remuneration
– negotiated or determined by the Federal Court. 
Can be determined when the Court first grants the 
licence, if parties agree
– unclear that the Federal Court is the appropriate body 
because of lack of expertise on such matters. Would 
Commissioner of Patents be better?
Other notable 
inclusions
– can apply for an ancillary licence for dependent 
patents; can apply for amendments
– revocation where substantive circumstances no 
longer exist or for acts of non-compliance. Consider 
adverse effect on licensee and eligible importing 
country
– ancillary licence is useful addition
– important to have an opportunity to amend – not 
provided in Canadian legislation
– query which acts of non-compliance justify revocation
AUSFTA, Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement; PPI, patented pharmaceutical invention; TRIPS, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights; WTO, World Trade Organization.
a  Eligible importing country includes: least developed countries; countries self-nominated to the TRIPS Council; countries prescribed by regulation.
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صخلم
ةيودلأا ةحاتإ يرسيتل ”سبيرت“ ةيركفلا ةيكللما قوقلح ةيراجتلا بناولجاب قلعتلما قافتلاا في ةنورلما بناوج مادختسا
 تاءارب  رثأ  نم فيفختلا  ةيفيك ةلكشلم قافلآا في لولح دجوت لا
 ةيساسلأا  ةيودلأا  ءاتيإ  لىع  ةينلاديصلا  تاضرحتسلما  عاترخا
 ققتح  لمو  .لبق  نم  لالحا  ناك  ماك  لماعلا  في  ةيرقفلا  بوعشلا  لىإ
 ليلقلا  ىوس  ةعسولما  ةيسايسلا  تاشاقنلاو  ةيميداكلأا  تاقيلعتلا
 ةيلود كوكص قيبطت نم مغرلا لىعو .ةيلمعلا لئاصلحا صيخ مايف
 عينصتلاب  حمست  تاعيشرت نسب  نادلبلل  حماسلل  ليالحا  تقولا  في
 لاإ ،عاترخا تاءارب لىع ةلصالحا ةينلاديصلا تاضرحتسملل ماعلا
 مظعمو ةمئلام تاعيشرت نلآا ىتح نست لم نادلبلا نم ديدعلا نأ
 متي هنأ  في ةيسيئرلا  لكاشلما ىدحإ لثمتتو .اهنم دفتست لم نادلبلا
 انهأ  لىع  تاعيشرتلا  ذيفنتو  ةيلودلا  كوكصلا  تابلطتم  لىإ  رظنلا
 ةديدج تلاوامح لىإ ةقرولا هذه وعدتو .ةيلمع يرغ ةجردب ةمراص
 ليودلا  نوناقلل  ةددحلما  تابلطتلما  بسانت  ةيلمع  تاعيشرت  نسل
 ةداعإ لخدلا ةعفترلما لودلا لىع يغبني هنأ معزتو .اهادعتت نأ نود
 يرفوتو ةبسانم ةيعيشرت تايلآ نسل يقلاخلأا مهمازتلا لىع زيكترلا
 متي  يذلا  عيشرتلا  ةدوسم مدختستو .اهمادختسلا ةمئلام زفاوح
 نكمي يتلا ةيفيكلا حاضيلإ ايلاترسأ في نهارلا تقولا في اهيف رظنلا
.ةيلمع ةيعيشرت رطأ عضو الهلاخ نم
摘要 
利用 TRIPS 灵活性方便药品的使用
在为世界上的穷人提供基本药物方面，如何缓解药物
专利影响的问题一直以来都远未解决。广泛的学术评
论和政策争论在实际成果上收效甚微。虽然现在已经
制定了可使国家立法允许非商标制造专利药品的国际
契约，但是许多国家尚未制定适当的立法并且大多数
国家还没有加以利用。其中一个主要的问题在于国际
契约和实施立法的要求被视为太过严格而行不通。本
文要求尝试在国际法的范围内制定符合其规定要求的
可行的立法。本文认为，高收入国家应该将重点转到
自己的道德义务上，制定适当的立法机制，并提供使
用这些机制的适当的激励措施。文章使用澳大利亚目
前正在考虑的立法草案来说明如何制定可行的立法框
架。
Résumé
Utiliser les flexibilités des aspects des droits de propriété intellectuelle liés au commerce (ADPIC) pour faciliter l’accès aux 
médicaments
La question de savoir comment mitiger l’impact des brevets 
pharmaceutiques sur la fourniture de médicaments essentiels aux 
populations pauvres du monde est, plus que jamais, loin d’être résolue. 
Peu de résultats pratiques sont ressortis des commentaires et débats 
politiques académiques. Bien que des instruments internationaux soient 
maintenant mis en place et permettant les pays à promulguer des lois 
permettant la fabrication de versions génériques de médicaments 
brevetés, de nombreux pays n’ont pas encore adopté de législation 
appropriée et la plupart n’en ont même pas encore fait l’usage. Un 
des principaux problèmes est le fait que les exigences des instruments 
internationaux et la législation à mettre en œuvre sont perçues comme 
rigoureuses et impraticables. Cette publication appelle à de nouvelles 
tentatives de promulgation d’une législation exécutable, compatible 
avec les exigences prescrites par la loi internationale, sans pour autant 
les dépasser. Il est ici suggéré que les nations à hauts revenus se 
recentrent sur leur obligation morale de promulguer des mécanismes 
législatifs appropriés et veillent, de manière appropriée, à favoriser leur 
utilisation. Un projet de loi actuellement à l’étude en Australie est utilisé 
pour montrer comment des cadres législatifs praticables peuvent être 
développés.
Резюме
Использование гибкости положений ТРИПС для облегчения доступа к лекарствам
Проблема смягчения последствий влияния фармацевтических 
патентов на поставки основных лекарственных средств 
малоимущим людям в мире так же далека от своего разрешения, 
как и раньше. Множество комментариев ученых и политических 
дебатов мало к чему привели с точки зрения практических 
результатов. Хотя в настоящее время действуют международные 
документы, согласно требованиям которых страны должны 
принять законодательство, разрешающее производство аналогов 
запатентованных лекарственных препаратов, многие страны еще 
не приняли соответствующее законодательство, а большинство 
стран, которые уже приняли его, пока не воспользовались 
им. Одной из основных проблем является то, что требования 
международных документов и законодательства, реализующего 
их, считаются настолько строгими, что кажутся неосуществимыми. 
Эта статья призывает предпринять новые попытки ввести 
в действие работоспособное законодательство, которое 
вписывается в установленные требования международного права 
и не выходит за их границы. В статье утверждается, что странам 
с высоким уровнем дохода следует переориентироваться на 
выполнение своего морального обязательства ввести в действие 
соответствующие законодательные механизмы и обеспечить 
надлежащие стимулы для их использования. Законопроект, 
который в настоящее время рассматривается в Австралии, 
используется для иллюстрации возможности разработки 
работоспособной законодательной базы.
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Resumen
Cómo utilizar los aspectos flexibles de los ADPIC para facilitar el acceso a los medicamentos
El problema de cómo mitigar el impacto de las patentes farmacéuticas 
en el suministro de medicamentos básicos a los pobres del mundo está 
aún lejos de resolverse. Los amplios debates políticos y académicos no 
han conseguido mucho en lo que a resultados prácticos se refiere. Si bien 
se han puesto en marcha instrumentos internacionales que permiten 
a los países promulgar leyes que permitan la fabricación genérica de 
fármacos patentados, muchos países no han promulgado aún leyes 
adecuadas y la mayoría de ellos aún no las han aplicado. Un problema 
importante es que los requisitos de los instrumentos internacionales y 
la normativa de aplicación son demasiado estrictos para ser factibles. 
Este artículo lanza un llamamiento para que se realicen nuevas tentativas 
de promulgación de leyes factibles que se ajusten a los requisitos 
preceptivos del derecho internacional sin sobrepasarlos. Sostiene que 
los países de renta alta deben centrar su atención en su obligación moral 
de promulgar mecanismos legislativos adecuados y facilitar incentivos 
apropiados para su uso. Se emplean los proyectos de ley que se están 
considerando actualmente en Australia para demostrar cómo pueden 
desarrollarse marcos legislativos factibles.
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